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features of the U.S. Merger Guidelines can provide useful lessons. For developing countries also undertaking major revisions to their competition laws, Japan's experience may show that the text of a legal transplant is only one important consideration. Additionally, the context of competition law and the subtext of changes to the existing norms of economic regulation may be just as important to "importing" antitrust law into developing nations or transitional economies.
Based on their text, context, and subtext, the New Merger Guidelines signal a great change in how Japan will deal with mergers in the future. The text of the New Merger Guidelines contains significant differences from its predecessor and shows a strong resemblance to the U.S. Merger Guidelines. In particular, the text of the New Merger Guidelines greatly fleshes out Japan's approach to merger review, such as substitution and market concentration, although the question of how to handle efficiencies, which continues to vex other enforcement agencies, remains largely unanswered.
However, the changed text of the New Merger Guidelines is not their only important implication. Based on their context, while Japan's New Merger Guidelines may prove important, their role will likely differ greatly from that of the U.S. Merger Guidelines. Indeed, because of the subtext of the New Merger Guidelines, they may mark a change in the norms of administrative practice in this area of Japanese governance.
II. JAPAN'S NEW MERGER GUIDELINES-THE TEXT
Japan's New Merger Guidelines are interesting as a literal example of comparative law 5 That is, it is interesting to compare them both to Japan's previous merger guidelines, adopted in 1998 ("Old Merger Guidelines"), 6 as well as to the U.S. Merger Guidelines. Specifically, the New Merger Guidelines mark a stark difference in both text and content from the Old Merger Guidelines. The New Merger Guidelines incorporate important aspects of the IJS. Merger Guidelines, especially their reliance on numerical guideposts for industry concentration, a feature absent from the text of the Old Merger Guidelines. While Japan's Old Merger Guidelines were not unusual in their content, they did not provide particularly detailed guidance. They did, 26:515 (2006) however, acknowledge many factors in merger review that would be familiar to an American antitrust lawyer. Specifically, the Old Merger Guidelines pointed to issues such as the market share of the merging firms, the possibility of new entrants, the existence of substitute products, and the possibility of efficiencies. 7 However, the Old Merger Guidelines' discussion of these points was relatively sparse, often listing relevant factors with no indication of how important they were or how they would be measured.
The New Merger Guidelines have greatly expanded the detail in which they discuss particular aspects of merger review (e.g., the question of substitution). If two merging firms produce the same product X, antitrust authorities ask whether another product Y can serve as a substitute for X in order to determine whether the market in question is "just X" or whether it contains both X and Y. If consumers readily substitute Y for X, then the products should be readily considered to be competitors in the same market. 8 Providing little explanation of this concept, the Old Merger Guidelines contained a one paragraph example case description:
When markets exist for substitute products with functions and uses similar to the goods, th[e] substitute products might have an impact on competition in a particular field of trade in accordance with the degree of substitutability in terms of marketing networks, demand sources, prices, and other factors. By contrast, the New Merger Guidelines spend three pages on substitution, 10 setting forth the idea of "demand and suply substitution that informs traditional antitrust analysis of market power" in terms that would be quickly recognizable to American antitrust lawyers as the cross-price elasticity of demand test: 2 On the other hand, when the products X and Y have similar functions and efficacy, if the price of product X is increased, then users [will] [come] to purchase the product Y and the price of product Y is likely to increase. Therefore, if the sales or the price of product Y increases in response to an increase in the price of product X, it can be considered that products X and Y have similar functions 26:515 (2006) and efficacy.
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While this paragraph of the New Merger Guidelines alone shares more detail with the reader than the Old Merger Guidelines' entire discussion of substitution, the several remaining pages of the New Merger Guidelines' section on substitution flesh out additional details relevant to this standard.
But not every aspect of merger review receives such explication in the New Merger Guidelines. To take another example that is particularly interesting to scholars and practitioners in the area, 14 the Old Merger Guidelines' entire discussion of efficiencies states:
Economies of scale, integration of production facilities, specialization of factories, reduction in transportation costs, efficiency in research and development, and other improvements of efficiency caused by the M&A are examined in their impact on competition. When improvement of efficiency is deemed likely to stimulate competition (for example, a low-ranking company increase[s] its cost competitiveness, financing capability, raw material procurement ability and other fundamentals through a merger, which leads to lower product prices and higher quality of the goods, and in turn promotes competition with high-ranking companies), these positive impacts are considered.
15
This amounts to little more than a laundry list of potential efficiencies and the statement that they are relevant to merger review. Unlike the case of substitution, the New Merger Guidelines basically left this section unaltered. 16 However, unlike substitution, the issue of how antitrust authorities should apply the concept of efficiencies continues to be a source of argument as well as agreement. How and whether the U.S. antitrust authorities should consider increased efficiency as a justification for an otherwise anti-competitive merger continues to be a contentious question in the United States,' while internationally, there is a significant gap with the Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 209 (1992) ("The most controversial issue in current U.S. merger policy is whether there ought to be an 'efficiencies defense' to individual mergers when the combined market share of the parties, existing concentration in the market and other factors would make those mergers otherwise illegal."). This has continued to be a controversial topic up until the present day. 26:515 (2006) European Union, where increased efficiency has at times been treated as a reason to block a merger because a more efficient firm will harm competitors.
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Arguably, the most important difference between the Old Merger Guidelines and the New Merger Guidelines lies in the New Merger Guidelines' approach to measuring market concentration, namely the adoption of the U.S.-style Herfindahl-Herschmann Index ("HHI") guideposts in the New Merger Guidelines. 19 As with substitution and efficiencies, the Old Merger Guidelines took a qualitatively normal, but quantitatively sparse, approach to market share:
Market share is a basic indicator which indicates the position of the companies in the market. If the companies attempting to effect an M&A have a high market share, the increase in shares caused by the M&A is large, or there is a substantial difference between the market shares of the companies concerned and those of the competitors, the M&A will have a substantial impact on competition. The HHI, a metric of market concentration, 2 4 has been very prominent in American merger review since 1982. In particular, the U.S. Merger Guidelines presume that markets with an HHI below 1000 are "unconcentrated," those with an HHI between 1000 and 1800 are only "moderately concentrated," and those with an HHI above 1800 are "highly concentrated., 25 Where a market has an HHI of about 1800, a merger that increases HHI by more than 100 is presumptively considered to increase or enhance market power or facilitate its use. As a result, the numbers 1000, 1800, and, to a lesser extent, 100, have fostered a kind of numerology among American antitrust lawyers. By contrast, the New Merger Guidelines set forth explicit HHI signposts describing when certain levels of market concentration will trigger particular policy responses by the JFTC. In particular, like the Old Merger Guidelines, the New Merger Guidelines purport to be an interpretation of the Antimonopoly Law's 27 prohibition on mergers "where the effect of [the] merger may be to substantially restrain competition. ', 28 But the New Merger Guidelines diverge by setting forth more than just " [underlying] principles. 29 For example, the New Merger Guidelines conclude that a merger will not substantially restrain competition if, along with other factors, the market in question is "not oligopolistic," which is further defined as being a market with an HHI of "less than 1000.,,30 Similarly, the New Merger Guidelines propose a higher level of scrutiny for markets with an HHI above 1800, and an intermediate analysis for markets with an HHI between 1000 and 1800, which is deemed to be "not highly oligopolistic. 3 1 The New Merger Guidelines also conclude that "the possibility that the effect" of a merger "may be substantially to restrain competition . . . is usually thought to be small" where the incremental increase in HHI of the merger "is less than 100.,,32
The New Merger Guidelines' use of HHI marks a fairly stark contrast to the Old Merger Guidelines. The New Merger Guidelines obviously closely resemble the standards that have been set forth in the U. Guidelines. However, it would be a mistake to view them as a wholesale importation. For example, a market's HHI is only one determinant, along with the merged firm having a market share no greater than 25%, for the conclusion that "the effect of a horizontal business combination may not be substantially to restrain competition in a particular field of trade.
3 3 The word "may" seems to reserve some continued discretion in this apparent safe harbor and the JFTC has not fully embraced HHI alone. Yet, the JFTC's New Merger Guidelines show an unmistakable American influence-and by extension, the influence of the economic analysis that has greatly informed the U.S. Merger Guidelines.
III. THE CONTEXT While Japan's New Merger Guidelines may resemble the U.S. Merger Guidelines in form, due to their context, the New Merger Guidelines will likely perform a different function. Unlike in the United States, the New Merger Guidelines in Japan are not a response to perceived overactive merger enforcement in the face of a merger boom. Instead, Japan's move appears to be part of a larger domestic plan of administrative law reform, :'together with domestic and external pressure to harmonize antitrust laws with the European Union and United States. 34 While the New Merger Guidelines may succeed in Japan, any success will be different from that of the U.S. Merger Guidelines. The U.S. Merger Guidelines represent a cautious success against the backdrop of overaggressive, unpredictable antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement during the decades prior to the Guidelines' enactment has been seen as questionably overactive. 35 As a result, the 1982 iteration of the U.S. Merger Guidelines was seen as a kind of watershed in American antitrust, in which substantive standards and procedural steps are based more on economic logic merger review.
By contrast, Japan's merger enforcement has been characterized as severely under-aggressive. 4 
'
In the forty year period after the Antimonopoly Law's adoption, there was only one clear instance where Japanese government opposition led to the abandonment of a merger. 42 Of course, that statistic could be the result of informal consultations that made clear to merging entities which transactions would be approved before the merger became public, or the result of active industrial policy whereby mergers were government-led. 43 There is another reason why Japan has not seen highly aggressive merger enforcement: historically, Japan has not had many mergers. The volume of mergers in America, measured by either the dollar amount or as a percentage of the total capitalization of the stock market, has historically dwarfed the volume of mergers in Japan. 44 And while Japan has recently seen an increase in merger activity, including a notable hostile takeover battle, 5 from 1971 to 1990, Japan saw only three takeover bids. In contrast, the United States saw 1032 bids during the much shorter period Commission] was ridiculed as the watchudog tuhat had never bit" and that even i its more currently active period, "[a]s far as domestic mergers are concerned, it is reasonable to assume that the JFTC's generally likely to take a lenient view.").
42 Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 214. , 1925-1975 (1983) (discussing how, in past era, Japanese bureaucrats took initiative in fostering mergers in industries where consolidation seemed appropriate). 26:515 (2006) from 1985 to 1990.46 Accordingly, while Japan's New Merger Guidelines may be seen as a success, they cannot play the same role that the U.S. Merger Guidelines have. The baseline from which Japanese merger enforcement starts is too significantly different. Nonetheless, the New Merger Guidelines could succeed as an example of a late-mover advantage, giving Japan the opportunity to learn from the U.S. experience, as its own merger wave may be only just beginning.
IV. THE SUBTEXT
The New Merger Guidelines do not merely announce a list of concerns that the JFTC will consider, as the Old Merger Guidelines did with such important issues in merger review as efficiencies 47 and substitution. 48 Instead, the New Merger Guidelines add an explicit discussion of the method that the JFTC will use. The adoption of HHI and clear benchmarks for how it will be used in decision-making directly informs merging firms and antitrust lawyers about the JFTC's intended practice. While these explicit statements are important, what they implicitly communicate is also important. By making such statements, the JFTC effectively makes a commitment about what it will do. To the extent that firms and lawyers read and believe the guidelines, they will take actions that rely on them. As a result, the subtext of the New Guidelines is that the JFTC is moving towards an administrative model that relies less on the reservation of discretion and more on establishing clear patterns and processes.
49
In fact, the New Merger Guidelines explicitly state that their purpose is "to enhance transparency and predictability regarding the review of business combination," in contrast to the Old Merger Guidelines, which "clarified [underlying] principles." 50 The implicit message is that telling the world the factors you will consider in making your administrative determinations is not enough anymore; you must actually explain how you will weigh these factors and what kind of process you will use. The result on paper is a more constrained model of administrative decision-making.
The importance of the JFTC's commitment is accentuated by the baseline model of how the JFTC has operated in the past. Looking beyond 46 See Katsumoto Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 608-09 (1999) .
47 See supra notes 6-8. 48 See supra notes 14-18. 49 Indeed, this is a broader aim of Japan's current overarching legal reform project. See id. 50 See New Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, at Introduction. 26:515 (2006) merger review alone, the JFTC has tended to act informally and tries to get compliance by firms that seek to merge without resorting to formal agency decisions. 51 By shifting towards a model of clear statements, safe harbors, and numerical measures, the JFTC would seem to be changing not just the rules of merger review, but their mode of regulation. There are many possible reasons for this shift. One in particular is certainly the recent drive towards harmonization in global merger review. Through institutions such as the International Competition Network, a lot of effort has been invested in trying to promote global adoption of so-called "best practices" in merger review. 52 Thus, by adopting the New Merger Guidelines, Japan has signed on to both a new mode of regulation as well as a harmonized standard for global mergers.
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V. LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS
Japan is definitely not a developing nation. Despite that fact, developing nations may want to watch what happens with Japan's New Merger Guidelines. For several reasons, Japan's experience will involve challenges that many developing nations also face. First, Japan is trying to tame a discretionary, sometimes interventionist, approach to economic regulation-something many developing and transitional economies are also trying to do. Second, Japan is trying to fit its merger review regime into a world where American and European models of merger review are already established-a challenge that developing nations, including China, 5 3 are also undertaking. Finally, Japan is trying to implement these measures while simultaneously reforming its underdeveloped legal system. The New Merger Guidelines could provide developing nations with a lesson about how to move from a less predictable ad hoc approach to regulation to one that provides more certainty for market players. Recent studies have suggested that state-centered interventionist systems of law and regulation tend to inhibit economic growth. 54 Although they have their detractnr, there has been a proliferation of studies and prescriptions based on the notion that restraining and formalizing government regulation is 26:515 (2006) critical for economic development. 55 Adopting a set of standards such as the New Merger Guidelines represents Japan's attempt at moving towards formal rules and away from the kind of discretion that is more easily abused. As a public statement, the New Merger Guidelines also serve as an attempt at creating a level of insulation for the antitrust regulators and at committing the regulators to a particular course of action in advance of any one merger that may generate political pressures.
Additionally, the New Merger Guidelines provide an example to developing nations of harmonization within the global trading system. Increasingly important cross-border mergers have ratcheted up the pressure to harmonize standards for merger review. 5 6 The New Merger Guidelines integrate important standards, such as the use of HHI as a guidepost, that are already common in the United States and the European Union. But the New Merger Guidelines integrate these standards with an existing Japanese agency, the Fair Trade Commission, and within the context of Japan's bureaucracy and political system. As a result, should this effort succeed, it may yield important lessons for developing nations about how to introduce substantive "global" standards into their own domestic regulatory institutions.
Finally, the New Merger Guidelines may provide lessons to developing nations about how to craft competition policy while simultaneously building a deep and broad-based legal infrastructure. While Japan is not a developing country, it is nevertheless in the midst of a process to develop its legal institutions.
Developing nations are also undertaking similar challenges. 5 8 Japan's challenge is to develop its antitrust regime while simultaneously building its legal institutions. To the extent that it succeeds in this effort, there may be important lessons for developing nations that also must tackle both of these challenges. The lessons for developing nations from Japan's experience are not yet totally clear.
After all, the New Merger Guidelines are quite new. However, given the rapid increase in Japanese merger activity, as well as the potential increase in cross-border merger activity, we should soon have cases involving the New Merger Guidelines from which to draw lessons on what to do and-just as importantly-what not to do.
VI. CONCLUSION
Japan's New Merger Guidelines look pretty familiar to American antitrust eyes, particularly the Japanese embrace of the U.S.-style HHI guideposts. However, Japan has an unfamiliar historical background of infrequent mergers and almost nonexistent formal merger review.
9 As a result, Japan's New Merger Guidelines mark a significant change, but given the different context, they cannot bring exactly the same kind of significant change that the U.S. Merger Guidelines did upon their adoption. Despite that, Japan's New Merger Guidelines may come to represent a successful legal transplant by incorporating global norms of substance and process.
